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INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES. By 
Paul J. Quirk. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1981. Pp. xi, 
260. $19.50. 
A common criticism of federal regulatory agencies is that they are sub-
ject to excessive influence from regulated industries. This influence induces 
regulatory officials to protect and even promote corporate economic inter-
ests, while neglecting the interests of the consumer and the public. 1 Com-
mentators have offered a variety of economic2 and political3 theories to 
explain industry influence. 
In Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies, Paul Quirk exam-
ines and questions the view that regulatory officials have personal and 
career incentives to promote policies favorable to industry. In particular, 
Quirk empirically considers whether regulatory officials have "pro-indus-
try" incentives resulting from pre-appointment policy views, budgetary 
concerns, and future employment aspirations in regulated industry.4 Based 
on his research, Quirk concludes that the incentives hypothesis5 "cannot be 
considered to provide an explanation of any overwhelming pro-industry 
bias often attributed to regulatory agencies. The incentives examined only 
irregularly support such behavior" (p. 177). 
Quirk's conclusions about the incentives hypothesis are based on inter-
views with fifty high-level officials in four regulatory agencies.6 This meth-
odology differs from more traditional approaches, which have attempted to 
describe the decision-making process of regulatory agencies (p. 34). Such 
descriptions help explain "who interacts with whom" and "the gathering of 
facts, weighing of arguments, and so on" (p. 34), but may overlook "states 
of mind (values, beliefs, hopes, fears, etc.)" (p. 35) that affect regulatory 
decisions. Quirk's reliance on interviews with high-ranking regulatory offi-
cials is unique because it "examine[s] some of the policy incentives actually 
I. Some proponents of this view contend that regulatory agencies have been captured by 
industry. In its extreme form, the "capture" theory over-simplifies regulatory politics by set-
ting up "industry" and "the public" as two diametrically opposed antagonists. As one com-
mentator notes, the theory depicts "a Manichean struggle between a discrete and powerful 
'corporate interest' and an equally well-defined, but politically feeble, consumer (or 'public') 
interest. Finally, that struggle, which is nothing but the interaction of those two vectors of 
force, leads to only one, melancholy outcome." Schuck, Book Review, 90 YALE L.J. 702, 705 
(1981) (reviewing J. DELONG, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (1980)). 
2. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sc1. I 
(1971). 
3. See T. Low,, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969); M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS 
BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955). 
4. Quirk's study does not test whether these incentives actually influence regulatory behav-
ior. Rather, the study simply tests whether such incentives exist. 
5. The terms "theory" and "hypothesis" are used interchangeably in this review. See THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1335 (rev. New College ed. 1975). 
6. The four agencies are the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA). 
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facing regulatory agencies and officials, by more or less direct observation 
and measurement of those incentives (as perceived)" (p. 34). 
Quirk's analysis first focuses on the "pro-industry appointments hypoth-
esis." This view theorizes that officials are appointed to regulatory agencies 
because they are sympathetic to industry desires and consequently their 
views provide an incentive to support industry interests.7 To test this the-
ory, Quirk asked officials to describe the policy views they held on regula-
tory issues prior to appointment. Quirk then coded each answer into one of 
the following categories: "anti-industry"; "moderate"; "pro-industry"; 
"program supporter"; or "no attitudes." Quirk found that 44 percent of the 
respondents held "anti-industry" policy attitudes when appointed, com-
pared to only 20 percent with "pro-industry" views (p. 49). Further, the 
majority of officials did not believe their policy views were even taken into 
account when they were appointed. Rather, most officials believed experi-
ence, professional skills, managerial ability, and personal traits were impor-
tant factors in their appointments (pp. 75-76). Clearly, these results do not 
support the theory that agency officials are selected because they sympa-
thize with industry interests. 
In the second part of the interview, Quirk questions the theory that reg-
ulatory officials protect industry interests in order to maintain budgetary 
support from the Administration and Congress, and insure stability and 
growth of their agencies. The results in this section show no "general per se 
pro-business incentives - that is, perceptions that decisions favored by in-
dustry across a wide range of issues would improve budgetary prospects" 
(p. 133). To the contrary, in one agency, the FTC, officials "overwhelm-
ingly reported that the agency's recent activism has had favorable effects on 
support for the agency's budget . . . ." (p. 108). Again, the results of this 
section of the study do not confirm the pro-industry incentives hypothesis. 
Finally, Quirk tests the theory that agency officials protect industry in-
terests in order to enhance future employment opportunities. Of the three 
incentives studied, this was "the most consistently pro-industry" (p. 176). 
An interesting anomaly, however, is that career incentives in the FTC 
"work in the opposite of the hypothesized direction" (p. 164). In the FTC, 
"[i]t is considered beneficial to demonstrate aggressiveness and effectiveness 
in enforcement, despite the fact that such behavior increases the regulatory 
burden on industry" (p. 164). Becaus~ the FTC is primarily staffed by law-
yers, who are perceived as likely to exhibit these characteristics in any em-
ployment capacity, Quirk suggests that such characteristics will make them 
"attractive potential employee[s] of the private sector" (p. 172). 
Following his analysis of these incentives, Quirk considers possibilities 
for minimizing industry influence in regulatory agencies. Quirk's data on 
the FTC argue against the uniform application of one commonly proposed 
reform - a ban that would prohibit regulatory officials from accepting em-
ployment in regulated industries for a specified period of time after leaving 
their agencies. Indeed, to the extent that prospective employers place a pre-
7. Quirk explains that he "refer[s] to this hypothesis as one involving incentives in the 
sense that one who holds a certain policy attitude has an incentive to support policies favored 
by that attitude." P. 23. 
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mium on the aggressive pursuit of agency objectives, an indiscriminate em-
ployment ban would prove counterproductive as well as fruitless (p. 190). 
However, Quirk does offer suggestions for (1) "reducing the large 
number of appointees with no particular pre-appointment attitudes, and re-
placing them with strongly consumer or other general interest-oriented in-
dividuals" (p. 181), and (2) eliminating any pro-industry budgetary 
incentives. At the same time, he acknowledges that many proposed regula-
tory reforms might create even more new problems while simultaneously 
"contribut[ing] to the much lamented complexity, rigidity, and cumber-
someness of government" (p. 183). 
Quirk's study, while creatively designed to provide fresh insights into 
industry influence in regulatory agencies, has some important methodologi-
cal shortcomings. Initially, "capture" theory adherents, who believe that 
regulatory officials represent the fox guarding the chickens, might not be 
convinced by a study in which the foxes are asked whether they are protect-
ing the chickens. In short, there is no guarantee that Quirk received com-
pletely candid and honest answers about pro-industry incentives from 
people entrusted to represent and protect the public. Further, some regula-
tory officials may have understated the significance of pro-industry incen-
tives in order to reduce cognitive dissonance. For example, it would not be 
surprising if some officials who held views sympathetic to industry interests 
when appointed later denied they ever held such views. 
Another problem, one inherent in a study based on "open-ended" ques-
tions, is that the interviewer inevitably injects his own biases into the pro-
cess of "coding" general answers into the categories that are being studied. 
In this respect, the study is far less scientific than one in which the respon-
dents answer narrow questions from a given set of responses. To his credit, 
Quirk recognizes and addresses this problem in the chapter "Comment on 
Coding" (p. 200), and acknowledges that the study is "really quite rudimen-
tary with respect to conceptualization, data collection, and measurement" 
(p. 193). 
Despite these methodological shortcomings, Quirk's research does pro-
vide a "rough measurement" (p. 33) of the three incentives studied. His 
work underscores the need for further related research and provides an ex-
perimental research method on which further studies can be based. 
